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Developing a Normative Critique of International Trade Law: 
Special & Differential Treatment 
ABSTRACT 
Although the problem of trade and inequality is central to the resolution of the WTO 
Doha Round and to contemporary trade policy in general, it is currently undertheorized 
from a normative perspective.  In this paper I develop a normative critique of WTO spe-
cial and differential treatment law, as a case study of how normative political theory can 
be applied to international economic law.  Using Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness, I 
argue both that special and differential treatment can play an important role in justifying 
economic inequalities according to the difference principle, and that special and differ-
ential treatment as currently structured fails abysmally to do so.  In doing so, I will also 
identify conceptual issues which need to be addressed in order to develop such a cri-
tique, and illustrate how I address such issues in my own work. 
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Developing a Normative Critique of International Trade Law: 
Special & Differential Treatment* 
I INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I develop a normative critique of WTO special and differential treatment 
(special and differential treatment), as a case study of how normative political theory 
can be applied to international economic law.  I will rely on John Rawls’ theory of Jus-
tice as Fairness, arguing in the process that the present structure of international trade 
does allow for the application of Rawls' account of justice as fairness, including a modi-
fied version of the difference principle. Using Justice as Fairness, I will argue both that 
special and differential treatment can play an important role in justifying economic ine-
qualities according to the difference principle, and that special and differential treatment 
as currently structured fails abysmally to do so.  Along the way, I will be identifying 
conceptual issues which need to be addressed in order to carry off such a critique, and 
suggesting how I resolve such issues in my own work. 
II PRELIMINARY MATTERS: WHAT IS INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING A 
NORMATIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
In order to develop a normative critique of trade law, one must first offer a general ac-
count of the relationship between trade law and political theory.  At first glance, it 
should seem obvious that trade law raises normative issues and should itself be subject 
to normative critique by political and moral philosophy.  However, it is not in fact so 
obvious, at least not in mainstream Anglo-American trade scholarship.1 Therefore, the 
first step is to develop a general account of the relationship between trade law and po-
litical theory. 
A. Trade and Justice Generally 
One approach to the relationship between international law and political theory is Lea 
Brilmayer’s “vertical thesis,” which treats this as a question of the legitimacy of state 
action.  For Brilmayer, “governmental coercion that extends across international borders 
                                                 
*  I would like to thank Dan Blanchard for his able research assistance, and the Boston College Law School Fund 
and Rev. Francis J. Nicholson, S.J. Fund for their generous financial support.  I would also like to thank my fel-
low conference participants for their insightful responses to this paper, in particular Christine Chwaszcza and 
Americo Beviglia Zampetti. 
1  See Joost Pauwelyn, Book Review: Just Trade, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV 101 (2005)(current scholarly ortho-
doxy eschews any normative analysis of international economic law). 
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is governmental coercion nonetheless,”2 and must be justified normatively by reference 
to some form of political theory, or it will lack legitimacy as a foreign policy.  Thus, the 
authority for transboundary state action is ultimately derived from its justification in 
political morality.3 Such justification is “vertical,” in that it is drawn “upwards” from 
the political norms regulating the underlying relationship between the individual and the 
relevant political institution.  This is in contrast to the traditional “horizontal” approach 
to state morality which analyzes the ethics between co-equal state actors.4 In other 
words, justification comes out of the political morality governing the state’s relationship 
with its own citizens, rather than any notion of the morality of a state’s relationship to 
other states.5  
Brilmayer’s theory is a powerful argument for the view that states act within a coher-
ent moral universe, in which the legitimacy of all their acts, both domestic and interna-
tional, derives from their observance of the same set of core political principles.  The 
justification of a state’s international acts “must be analyzed by reference to the consti-
tuting political theory that grants it authority to act domestically.”6  
Brilmayer’s theory operates at a sufficient level of generality to ground a basic rela-
tionship between international law and political theory, without arguing for a specific 
theory of political justification: 
“The vertical thesis itself does not supply such a domestic theory of political jus-
tification.  It merely asserts that whatever theory is used domestically is relevant 
also internationally.”7    
Instead, Brilmayer offers a meta-analysis of the relationship between international acts 
and political justification. Thus, for the governments of liberal states, this entails that 
they act as liberal states in their dealings abroad, in the same way we, their citizens, 
expect them to act as liberal states domestically. 
An alternative approach, followed by both Rawls and Charles Beitz, is to base the re-
lationship between political theory and trade law on the functional characteristics of 
trade law as a social institution.  The primary impetus towards justice, according to 
Rawls, is the fact that social cooperation gives rise to certain benefits and burdens, 
                                                 
2  Lea Brilmayer, Justifying International Acts 11 (1989). 
3  Id. at 16-17. 
4  Id. at 2. 
5  Id. at 16.  In this way Brilmayer’s theory is part of a general shift away from a “society of states” model of inter-
national law, and towards a global public law and a global society of persons.  See infra notes 10-11 and accom-
panying text. 
6  Id. at 22. 
7  Id. 
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which need to be allocated. For that cooperative social scheme to be just, those benefits 
and burdens should be allocated according to some relevant idea of what is ‘right.’8  In 
Beitz’ words, “the requirements of justice apply to institutions and practices (whether or 
not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social activity produces relative or abso-
lute benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not take place.”9  
International economic relations satisfy this condition, because they lead to increases 
in individual and national wealth through the operation of comparative advantage and 
principles of efficiency in general.  It is through international trade law that the terms of 
such cooperation are established.  Justice is therefore relevant to the operation of the 
social institutions which effectuate the international allocation of the benefits and bur-
dens of international economic cooperation, principally international trade law. 
Brilmayer and Rawls/Beitz offer two distinct ways in which one can articulate a gen-
eral account of the relationship between trade law and normative political theory.  Other 
alternatives could include a cosmopolitan approach emphasizing trade law’s impact on 
individuals’ life prospects, or a human rights approach emphasizing trade law’s impact 
on fundamental rights.  All of these alternatives perform the same conceptual function, 
namely to articulate the relationship between trade law and normative political theory as 
a general matter, before proceeding to apply a particular theory to trade law.   
B Level of Obligation: Duties between States versus Duties between In-
dividuals  
A second preliminary issue involves determining at which level to locate the claims and 
duties of justice: the state or the individual.  In other words, does international justice 
create claims on individuals, or on states?  
Traditionally, international law has followed the society of states model, in which the 
level of analysis would be the state, instead of the individual.  Thus moral duties, if they 
exist at the international level, exist between states as moral actors.  While more consis-
tent with orthodox international legal theory, this approach is no longer adequate given 
                                                 
8   JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4-5 (1971). 
9  CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131 (1979) [hereinafter BEITZ, POLITICAL 
THEORY].  Barry objects to the extension of justice as fairness obligations to international society on the basis of 
such economic relations, questioning whether such relations are in fact sufficiently reciprocal and dependent.  See 
Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in NOMOS XXIV 219, at 232-34 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1982).  As Beitz has since clarified, however, he is not arguing for the necessity of such 
obligations on the grounds of such relations, but merely for their relevance.  See Charles Beitz, Cosmopolitan 
Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591 (1983) [hereinafter Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals]. 
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the post-war human rights revolution, and leads to problems raised by critics such as 
Beitz.10     
The leading contemporary alternative is cosmopolitanism, which locates all interna-
tional moral obligations at the level of the individual.  However, cosmopolitanism de-
pends upon a view of international society as composed of persons, not states, which 
strikes many as empirically unjustifiable, given the many deep political and social divi-
sions among the world’s people.11 
I have attempted to follow something of a compromise approach, in which the role of 
justice in international economic relations is a function of our individual moral com-
mitments, carried out in the international arena through the state as our moral agent.12  
The obligation to do justice applies to the government of State X as the agent of its citi-
zens, stemming from the moral obligations of its citizens, the nature of justice, and the 
functions and powers of the state.  Where individuals cannot effectively act to address 
moral questions, the moral obligations create a case for moral agency at the collective 
level: the state.13 In other words, when the state acts on our behalf through the institu-
tions we create and sustain, it acts as our agent.  We as principals have a duty to instruct 
and monitor our agent, and bear ultimate responsibility for its conduct.  The moral re-
sponsibility remains ultimately our own, even if the acts are taken at the collective 
agency level.14   
                                                 
10  The state-moral person equation leads among other things to some of the abuses associated with an absolute 
sovereignty doctrine.  See BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, 71-83; see also FERNANDO TESÓN, A 
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (1998). 
11  This is the standard communitarian objection to the possibility of global justice.  However, in my view, globaliza-
tion is changing the nature of global social relations such that the cosmopolitan view of global social relations is 
increasingly tenable; indeed, in some areas and to some degree, global social relations may even meet more strin-
gent communitarian requirements for justice.  See Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International 
Law, 11 INT’L LEG. THEORY 9, 12-21 (2005). 
12  Another approach which seeks to resist this dualism is that taken by Christine Chwaszcza and others, in which 
both normative relations among individuals as individuals, and normative responsibilities of associations as asso-
ciations, are considered.  See Normative Theory and Transnational Economic Justice (this volume). 
13  See e.g. ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 28-44 (1995) (discussing the state’s respon-
sibility to act as our moral agent, in particular where individual action is barred or inadequate).   
14  Id. at 34-35.  Pogge characterizes this as a second-order responsibility, insofar as the principles of justice apply to 
institutions and not directly to the conduct of persons.  Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 
ETHICS 48, 50 (1992).  Nevertheless, he acknowledges that we still retain responsibility, albeit indirect, for the 
justice of institutional practices we participate in.  Id. 
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This agency relationship is unaffected by whether the acts are domestic or interna-
tional: our institutions are our agents whenever and wherever they act, as a function of 
the vertical social contract and not the territoriality of the actions.  Internationally, this 
means that we as the citizens of State X have an obligation as human persons to ensure 
that the policies of the government of State X, our agent in international relations, are 
just vis-à-vis other human beings in State Y.  Otherwise, we as the citizens of state X 
risk being in violation of our own duty to the citizens of State Y.15   
III. INTERNATIONALIZING A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
A Choosing a Particular Theory 
With these preliminary matters addressed, the way is clear to choose a particular politi-
cal theory with which to develop a normative analysis of the justice of the trading sys-
tem.  I have chosen Rawls’ “Justice as Fairness,” despite its problematic relationship to 
international justice, because of its particularly fruitful approach to the problem of ine-
quality.16   
I am going to assume familiarity with the outlines of Rawls basic theory, and only 
note a few issues of significance to international trade law.  Rawls is particularly con-
cerned with inequalities that arise in the distribution of social primary goods.  Inequali-
ties in the natural distribution of natural primary goods, while they deeply affect peo-
ple’s life chances, are not themselves the subject of justice; rather, it is how a society 
responds to such inequalities that forms the basic subject of justice.  The fundamental 
problematic of distributive justice is that inequalities in natural primary goods often 
lead, through the operation of social institutions, to inequalities in the social distribution 
of social primary goods.  Such inequalities in social primary goods are not deserved, 
since they are deeply influenced by an underlying natural inequality untouchable by 
categories of moral responsibility and entitlement.  
Rawls argues that as a result, the basic structure of society must be arranged “so that 
these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.”17 The distribution of natu-
ral talents is to be considered a common asset, and society structured so that this asset 
                                                 
15  I say “risk,” because the intervening dynamics of representative government allow our state to pursue a given 
policy over our own, and even everyone’s, objection.  Thus the individual’s duty to act may only be an imperfect 
one, given the practical or institutional limits on individual action, whereas those same limits mean that collec-
tively the duty is a strong, perfect one.  GOODIN, supra note 12, at 32-33. 
16  Other liberal theories of justice such as utilitarianism and libertarianism founder in one way or another on the 
problem of inequality.  See FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
JUST TRADE 110-18 (TRANSNATIONAL 2003). 
17  RAWLS, supra note 8, at 102. 
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works for the good of the least well-off.  Rawls develops this view into the theory of 
Justice as Fairness, in particular the “difference principle,” which states that inequalities 
in the distribution of social primary goods are justifiable only to the extent they benefit 
the least advantaged.  Satisfying this criterion could entail a variety of social measures, 
ranging from altering the structure of incentives to reward actions which benefit the 
least advantaged, such as the charitable gifts deduction found in income tax codes, to 
the outright redistribution of private wealth through progressive tax and welfare legisla-
tion.  Rawls contends that a society so organized would meet the basic Kantian obliga-
tion of mutual respect, to treat each other as ends and not as means.18  
B Adapting the Theory for International Application  
Having selected a body of normative political theory to work with, the next step in-
volves adapting the theory for use in an international context involving trade law.  Such 
adaptation may involve further preliminary matters, such as addressing any theoretical 
issues raised by the application of the theory across national boundaries.  Applying Jus-
tice as Fairness internationally poses such an issue, namely Rawls’ own refusal to ex-
tend the argument of A Theory of Justice to international distributive problems.   
In A Theory of Justice Rawls limits his theoretical enterprise to principles of justice 
for what he assumes to be a closed domestic society.  Even by 1979 the validity of this 
assumption was being seriously questioned.19 Globalization and other developments in 
international relations, particularly international economic relations, have rendered such 
an assumption untenable today.20 The fact of economic interdependence among the 
world's societies is a key element in establishing the possibility of international distribu-
tive obligations.21 As the international trade regulatory system has grown in scope and 
institutional capacity with the creation of the WTO, the gains from such social coopera-
tion increase, as does the institutional capacity for allocative decision-making and en-
forcement of resulting norms.  The need to allocate such benefits raises precisely the 
                                                 
18  Id., at 179.   
19  See BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 143-49. 
20  Pogge argues that Rawls’ bifurcation of the choice problems into separate domestic and international ones is 
untenable, because the international environment in which states actually operate will significantly affect the na-
ture of domestic societies, something representatives should know in the original position if they are to ratify their 
choices post-veil of ignorance.  THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 255-56, (1989). 
21  For example, in his study of the concept of fairness in international law, Thomas Franck concludes that the requi-
site level of community has emerged at the international level to sustain a fairness analysis. See THOMAS FRANCK, 
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (1995).   
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same sort of issues that are raised in domestic society when such benefits stand to be 
allocated.22    
If international economic relations establish the necessary predicate for contractarian 
obligations, then there is no theoretical bar to international distributive obligations pat-
terned along Rawlsian principles.23 This means that in principal, there is no objection to 
developing a Rawlsian account of international justice.24 
C Mapping the Theory to Trade Law 
A Rawlsian theory of international distributive justice will require three elements: pres-
entation of the facts of international inequality; an examination of the choice problem 
faced by those in the original position; and identification of the principles of justice 
which result. 
1.  Inequality in Natural Endowments and Social Goods 
There are many ways to catalogue inequalities in international economic relations.  
Contemporary analyses usually adopt economic “size” as the most relevant concept by 
which to evaluate and measure the impact of inequality on trade liberalization.  The 
smallness of an economy will always be determined in comparison with other econo-
mies, usually in terms of per capita GDP, supplemented by population and land size, as 
rough indicators of an economy's human, land and capital resources. 
The central insight from the literature on smaller economies and trade is that smaller 
economies share certain characteristics that make their participation in the international 
trading system problematic.25 Small size is also an additional complicating factor affect-
                                                 
22  In a similar sense, Pogge argues that the emergence of a single global institutional scheme involving both interna-
tional law and territorial states, has made all human rights violations “at least potentially everyone’s concern.”  
Pogge, supra note 14, at 51.  But see Samuel Freeman, Distributive Justice and The Law of Peoples, in RAWLS’ 
LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 243, 247 (REX MARTIN & DAVID A. REIDY EDS. 2006) (characterizing 
these institutions as ‘secondary’ in nature and not a global basic structure). 
23  See ONORA O’NEILL, BOUNDS OF JUSTICE 121 (2000) (given the nature of contemporary international economic 
relations, “[q]uestions of transnational economic justice cannot now be ruled out of order.”). 
24  But see David Miller, Collective Responsibility and International Inequality, in RAWLS’ LAW OF PEOPLES: A 
REALISTIC UTOPIA? 191 (REX MARTIN & DAVID A. REIDY EDS. 2006) (defending Rawls’ rejection of transnational 
extensions of Justice as Fairness by Beitz, Pogge and others). 
25  See, e.g., Dermot McCann, Small States in Globalizing Markets: The End of National Economic Sovereignty, 34 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 281 (2001) (citing broad consensus as to factors leading to smaller economies’ overde-
pendence on exports, and consequent vulnerability). 
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ing a country's growth, policy options and development potential.26 Smaller economies 
are vulnerable when they participate in trade for two reasons: the relative openness of 
smaller economies, and the asymmetry between larger and smaller economies in re-
sources and economic strength.  Larger economies take advantage of their size to target 
smaller economy markets for larger economy exports.  Overall, smaller economies face 
the risk that the distribution of benefits and burdens within the trading system will be 
skewed in favor of the dominant party.  
These contingencies form the essential context in which any normative political the-
ory must operate.  Translated into Rawlsian terms, the characteristics of smaller econo-
mies are a complex blend of both natural and social inequalities.  Natural inequalities, or 
those which at the individual level we are “born” with, are strongly reflected in smaller 
economy characteristics such as smallness in population, smallness in territory, and 
heavy reliance upon commodities exports, which can reflect both differences in climate 
and the narrow range of readily exploitable resources such economies may have been 
naturally granted.27 
In contrast, social inequalities are those inequalities essentially connected to social 
institutions. Social institutions, including the smaller economy's political and economic 
systems, and international economic law and diplomacy, establish patterns of distribu-
tion of social goods such as wealth, knowledge, rights and privileges within and be-
tween states, which "define men's [sic] rights and duties and influence their life pros-
pects."28 Such allocations are heavily influenced by underlying natural inequalities, and 
by non-economic factors such as racial, religious or nationalistic prejudice. 
Smaller economy characteristics that reflect social inequalities include their limited 
human and technological resources, which reflect both small populations and the effects 
                                                 
26  Overcoming Obstacles and Maximizing Opportunities: A Report by the Independent Group of Experts on Smaller 
Economies and Western Hemispheric Integration, March 1998, at 2; see McCann, supra note 23 (intensity of 
pressures facing smaller economies raises question as to their continued effective sovereignty); RICHARD L. 
BERNAL, THE INTEGRATION OF SMALL ECONOMIES IN THE FREE TRADE AREA OF  THE AMERICAS 9 (Ctr. for Strate-
gic and Int’l Studies, Policy Papers on the Americas, vol. IX study 1, 1998). 
27  It can be argued that these inequalities also reflect social factors such as population policies, the international law 
of boundaries, and colonial patterns of economic specialization.  No classification between natural and social ine-
qualities will be pure, even at the individual level (strength and intelligence can depend as much on prenatal nu-
trition, which is influenced by social factors, as by inherited genetic traits) – the distinction must be based on pre-
dominance and emphasis. 
28  RAWLS, supra note 8, at 7. 
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of social allocations resulting in inadequate educational and research institutions.29  The 
small size of the domestic market reflects both small populations and the effects of 
employment, colonial economic policies, and domestic wage and industrialization pat-
terns, including patterns of international demand, market access and the terms of trade.  
Low GDP and/or low GDP per capita are complex indicators reflecting the interaction 
of many of the natural and social inequalities already discussed.  Finally, the small size 
of the domestic market creates a high dependence on international trade for both export 
markets and domestic goods, resulting in a high degree of vulnerability to fluctuation in 
world prices and demand for primary product exports, and changes in market access and 
the terms of trade. 
The key normative assumption underlying a Rawlsian account of inequality is that 
differences in natural endowments, and any differences in the allocation of social goods 
stemming from these natural inequalities, are unmerited.  In Rawls' terms, they are mor-
ally arbitrary.30 Setting aside the issues of migration and conquest, states must in general 
accept the extent of resources to be found within their territories.31 At the individual 
level, people are simply born into existing states, the resource levels of which they 
could neither choose in advance nor influence.  These national boundaries and the re-
source endowments they encompass have a profound distributional impact on individu-
als’ life prospects.32 
This is precisely the pattern of naturally-influenced social advantage which, at the 
individual level, requires justification according to principles of justice.  The fact that a 
                                                 
29  Disaggregating the inequality effects of social allocations between states, from the inequality effects of social 
policies within states, is a complex problem analogous to the debate at the domestic level over the degree of am-
bition- versus endowment - sensitivity of distributive theories of justice.  I don’t have an answer for this problem 
– simply an emphasis here on the allocations between states.  On the related domestic issue, see Ronald Dworkin, 
What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, and Part II: Equality of Resources, in 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185-
246, 283-345 (1981). 
30  Id. at 72. 
31  I do not propose to address in this work the issues of migration and conquest as individual and collective re-
sponses to the arbitrariness of international borders and the particular resource “bundles” they circumscribe, 
though this is a key issue in global social policy today.  See generally FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE 
TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds.) (Pennsylvania 
State University Press 1992). 
32  Accord Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 195, 198 (1994) (borders 
have tremendous distributive impact).  Pogge, however, is engaged in a different normative task, demanding jus-
tification for any distributive functions borders would be assigned in an ideal world, whereas Rawls focuses on 
the justification of distributive effects which borders have in the world as it is.  
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particular state should be favorably situated with respect to natural resources, and that 
this fact results in advantages in the acquisition of social goods through the operation of 
domestic and international social institutions, does not by itself justify that state's claim 
to the benefits arising from that happy fact of geography.  To accept the status quo 
without further justification, would be to endorse a system of natural liberty as one’s 
principle of justice, which Rawls rejects as unjust precisely because it allows arbitrary 
advantages too much sway in determining life prospects.   
Together, these natural inequalities, the arbitrariness of their distribution, and their 
social consequences, form the subject of international justice.33 The task of international 
justice is to furnish principles that will serve both as a standard for evaluating the social 
response to natural inequalities, and as a guide to social institutions for making distribu-
tive allocations that will justify social inequalities.  In a Rawlsian approach to interna-
tional justice, those principles are to be chosen in the original position. 
2. The International Choice Problem 
For Rawls, the problem of choice of principles is articulated in terms of the original 
position, in which representative individuals must choose principles that will govern 
their future social relations under conditions of limited knowledge of the general human 
condition, and ignorance as to their particular future socioeconomic situation.  When the 
choice problem is one involving the choice of principles governing states, then the rep-
resentatives are present on behalf of states whose future intercourse will be governed by 
the principles chosen by that assembly.34   
                                                 
33  Strictly speaking, Rawls would disagree, viewing material inequalities as the subject of domestic justice.  How-
ever, for the reasons mentioned above, Rawls’ position on the exclusively domestic nature of material inequality 
is problematic.  See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.  But see Mathias Risse, How does the Global Or-
der Harm the Poor?,  33 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 349 (2005) (offering a thoughtful defense of Rawls’ position in 
THE LAW OF PEOPLES that domestic institutions are the chief determinant of material inequality).   
34  Rawls has been criticized for bifurcating the original position into a second, separate choice problem for interstate 
principles of cooperation, and for failing to take into account the evolution of contemporary international law to 
recognize non-state actors, including individuals.  See Lea Brilmayer, What Use is Rawls' Theory of Justice to 
Public International Law?, 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 36 (2000); TESÓN, supra note 10, ch. 4.  This second original 
position could be modified to include, for example, representatives of significant NGOs and international institu-
tions; or, as Beitz and Pogge suggest, collapsed into the first, thus forming a single cosmopolitan original posi-
tion.  Pogge, supra note 19, at 246-7; BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 150-151.  I will proceed along 
Rawlsian lines and argue in terms of a second "statist" original position, in order to illustrate that, even closely 
following Rawls' original approach, one is led to an international difference principle.  Accord Pogge, supra note 
30, at 197 (international egalitarian concerns can “easily” be accommodated within Rawls’ own two-step format).   
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The international choice problem these representatives face is, mutatis mutandis, 
identical to that faced in the domestic variant of the original position as Rawls sets it 
forth in A Theory of Justice:  
“Following out the conception of the initial situation, I assume that these repre-
sentatives are deprived of various kinds of information. While they know that 
they represent different nations each living under the normal circumstances of 
human life, they know nothing about the particular circumstances of their own 
society. . . . Once again the contracting parties, in this case representatives of 
states, are allowed only enough knowledge to make a rational choice to protect 
their interest but not so much that the more fortunate among them can take ad-
vantage of their special situation.”35 
Drawing further on Rawls’ description in A Theory of Justice of the knowledge and ra-
tionality of representatives in the domestic original position, we can also conclude that 
representatives of states know only that natural and social goods are necessary for the 
realization of domestic cooperative schemes, that inequalities of the sort discussed abo-
ve exist between states, and that such inequalities are highly correlated with resulting 
differences in wealth and other social advantages enjoyed among states. 
3. Principles of International Justice as Fairness 
a. An International Difference Principle 
Under those conditions, Rawls' argument in A Theory of Justice dictates that the repre-
sentatives of states should choose principles of justice which maximize the minimum 
bundle of social goods they are likely to receive in the face of life's inequalities.36 In the 
domestic original position, the representatives choose two principles, a principle of 
equal liberty and a principle of distributive justice.   
In Rawls’ account of the international choice problem, representatives of states do 
not in fact choose a principle of distributive justice.37 However, as has been discussed 
above, the problem of inequality and the choice problem faced by representatives of the 
international community are present internationally just as they are in the case of do-
mestic society.  Given the similarity in social facts and their consequences as well as the 
identical constraints inherent in the original position, the most logical conclusion is that 
                                                 
35  RAWLS, supra note 8, at 378. 
36  Id. at 152-57. 
37  Frank J. Garcia, The Law of Peoples, 23 Hous. J. Int'l L. 659, 660 (2001) (book review) (Rather than applying 
principles of distributive justice to international law Rawls instead discusses the foreign policy of a liberal peo-
ple). 
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the same principles would be chosen.38 Parties to this international original position 
would view the distribution of resources in the same manner that parties in the domestic 
original position viewed the distribution of natural talents: as morally arbitrary.39 As has 
been argued by Beitz, Barry and others, there is no compelling reason to assume that the 
content of the principles would change as a result of enlarging the scope of the original 
position.40  
I therefore follow these theorists and suggest an international difference principle 
drawn directly from Rawls’ own domestic elaboration: International social and eco-
nomic inequalities are just only if they result in compensating benefits for all states, and 
in particular for the least advantaged states. 
The predicates are identical: natural inequalities, social inequalities, their interrela-
tionship, and the effect of both on life chances.  The structure of the original position is 
identical, in terms of what the representatives both know and don’t know about their 
future social environment.41  Moreover, we can make the same assumptions about the 
rationality of the representatives.42  Therefore, Rawls’ argument should lead to the same 
conclusion: international social inequalities are justifiable only if they satisfy the diffe-
rence principle.  
D Developing a Normative Critique of Trade Law 
Having determined that international economic relations are subject to the difference 
principle, it remains to develop a normative critique of trade law in terms of the theory.  
If we accept Justice as Fairness, then given the nature of international trade, it follows 
that international trade is subject to a suitably modified form of the difference principle. 
                                                 
38  This conclusion is consistent with the positions taken by the leading proponents of a Rawlsian theory of interna-
tional distributive justice.  See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 131 (1973) (“I can see no 
reason why within Rawls’ theory the representatives of different countries should not, meeting under the condi-
tions specified, agree on some sort of international maximin.”); BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 138 
(logic of original position would by analogy lead to choice of a global resource redistribution principle);   POGGE, 
supra note 19, at 245 (parties in original position would favor a global economic order sensitive to distributional 
concerns). 
39  Accord BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 137; POGGE, supra note 19, at 247. 
40  See, e.g., Pogge, supra note 30, at 197; BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 151; BARRY, supra note 35, at 
128-32; David A. J. Richards, International Distributive Justice, in NOMOS XXIV, at 292.  
41  See BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 141 (reviewing analogous natural and social facts known in an 
international original position). 
42  Accord BARRY, supra note 35, at 133 (would be just as rational to pursue a maximin strategy in a second original 
position and choose the difference principle, as it would be in the domestic original position). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 66) 
- 13 - 
1 Just Trade Involves Free Trade 
The core commitment of contemporary trade law is to free trade: international economic 
relations are to be free (or as free as possible) from governmental restrictions in the 
form of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and nondiscriminatory with respect to country of 
origin (the most-favored-nation rule) and domestic origin (the national treatment rule).  
The starting point, therefore, in the elaboration of a normative theory of trade is to ex-
amine whether, from a normative point of view, this commitment to free trade is justifi-
able.   
One can deduce from the principle of Justice as Fairness that a well-ordered society 
requires free trade as a policy.43 Justice as Fairness consists of two principles: the prin-
ciple of equal liberty, and the difference principle.  Free trade follows from the implica-
tions of both principles.  First, we can argue from the first principle of justice that the 
freedom to make economic decisions as purchaser and consumer would be best pro-
tected by a system in which all had equal liberty with respect to such decisions, without 
interference from government-imposed restrictions and distortions.44 Tariff and non-
tariff barriers interfere with such liberty because the market effects of such public inter-
ventions distort purchasing and producing decisions.   
Free trade can therefore be expressed as a basic commitment to protect such freedom 
on the part of producers and consumers, by reducing or eliminating such interference.  
To this extent, a Rawlsian view of just trade is consistent with other liberal theories, 
such as libertarianism.  In Rawlsian terms, free trade guarantees with respect to interna-
tional economic activity “an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others.”45 Most-favored-nation status and national treatment 
function as corollary doctrines guaranteeing that such liberty is equal with respect to 
producers and consumers in all countries.46 
But adherence to the full extent of the principles of Justice as Fairness also requires 
evaluation of free trade in distributive terms.  Rawls’ second principle of justice, the 
difference principle, requires that inequalities in the distribution of social primary goods 
be justified by their contribution to the well-being of the least advantaged.   
                                                 
43  For an alternative approach justifying free trade as an actual principle of justice chosen in a Rawlsian original 
position, see Ethan B. Kapstein, Distributive Justice and International Trade, 13 ETHICS & INT'L. AFFAIRS 175, 
175-82 (1999). 
44  This is consistent with the requirements of Rawls’ first principle of justice. 
45  See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 60-61. 
46  Kapstein, supra note 40, at 188-89. 
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2 Just Trade is More Than Merely Free Trade 
I suggested above in my review of small economies in trade that there are many ine-
qualities affecting global economic relations.  Free trade is key to the justification of 
such inequalities.  By allowing the principle of comparative advantage to operate, free 
trade moves the trading system in the direction of operating to the benefit of the least 
advantaged, by affording them the opportunity for welfare increases through specializa-
tion.  Moreover, in a contingent sense, since free trade can lead to welfare growth, it is a 
precondition to a more just distribution of wealth and an improved standard of living for 
the least advantaged, both of which fulfill one’s moral duty to others.  Both justifica-
tions are also consistent with a utilitarian view of trade, which is the dominant theory of 
trade justice today.  
By introducing the difference principle into just trade theory, however, Rawls re-
quires us to go beyond both utilitarian and libertarian views of trade, by making the dis-
tribution of trade-created wealth, and in particular the plight of the least advantaged, 
central to any theory of just trade.  This has far-reaching implications, given the fact that 
trade economics suggests that smaller economies face difficult challenges successfully 
participating in the free trade system.  Moreover, trade economists suggest that free tra-
de by itself has mixed effects on the welfare of individuals in smaller economies.   
For this reason, free trade alone, which is essentially a libertarian system of equality 
of opportunity (reciprocal free trade rules), is not adequate to make the system work to 
the benefit of the least advantaged.  There is an inconsistency in the relationship be-
tween inequality in resources and effective equality of liberty and moral status.  The 
central distributive mechanism for libertarians is the market, since it is in the market 
that self-owning individuals can parlay their talents and abilities into title over other 
resources.  However, even if one grants that the free market is the best mechanism for 
basic distribution questions, the moral basis for this approach when applied to all dis-
tributive questions is substantially undermined by the reality of inequality in natural 
endowments.  Access to social resources, which enable one to effectively exercise one’s 
liberty and realize one’s life plans, will be skewed by natural endowments, whose dis-
tribution the individual had no control over.  
This same difficulty arises in the international distributive context: libertarianism 
fails to adequately confront the problem of inequality of resources in the international 
economic plane.47 A system of purely formal equality between states, equivalent in the 
                                                 
47  See POGGE, supra note 19, at 248 (inequalities in information and bargaining power may preclude possibility of 
freely negotiated international bargains).  For a review of other problems with a libertarian theory of international 
justice, see O'NEILL, supra note 22, at 289-90.  
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trade context to a system consisting exclusively of the core doctrines of free trade and 
nondiscrimination, undercuts the possibility of substantive equality between states: 
“There are several reasons for thinking that [global economic] interdependence 
widens the income gap between rich and poor countries even though it produces 
absolute gains for almost all of them. Because states have differing factor en-
dowments and varying access to technology, even “free” trade can lead to in-
creasing international distributive inequalities (and, on some views, to absolute 
as well as relative declines in the well-being of the poorest classes) in the ab-
sence of continuing transfers to those least advantaged by international trade.”48 
If according to Brilmayer’s vertical thesis, liberal states are to under a duty to organize 
their international economic relations according to liberal principles, then a free trade 
system consisting merely of “natural liberty” among states, a purely formal equality of 
opportunity, will be inadequate to achieve liberal justice absent some mechanism for 
addressing the problem of inequality in resources.49 The reality of gross inequalities in 
international endowments undercuts the possibility of effective equality of rights among 
states (sovereignty), which is the centerpiece of libertarianism.50 At the individual level, 
such a system will not guarantee satisfaction of even that minimal degree of basic needs 
necessary to make liberty rights meaningful.51 
For this reason, the difference principle suggests that the trading system will not be 
fully just, even if fully free, until it operates so as to render social inequalities beneficial 
to the least advantaged.  In other words, the difference principle suggests that just trade 
cannot consist only of free trade, but must also deviate from a system of pure reciproc-
ity of opportunity.  This is where special and differential treatment comes in, so it is to 
this set of doctrines that we now turn. 
IV APPLIED POLITICAL THEORY: SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT AS JUSTIFYING INEQUALITIES 
As I have discussed above, the global inequality in natural resources leads, through a 
complex variety of domestic and international private and public actions and institu-
tions, to social inequalities: inequalities in wealth, privileges, rights and opportunities.  
                                                 
48  BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 145-46 (citing RONALD FINDLAY, TRADE AND SPECIALIZATION 118-22 
(1970)). See also FRANCK, supra note 20, at 58 (GSP program adopted out of recognition that simple MFN-based 
trade "would produce further erosion of the developing world's share of world trade...."). 
49  Accord BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 9, at 163 (objections to justice of a domestic system of natural 
liberty apply with equal force to an international version as well). 
50  Franck also points out that the current pattern of international holdings is so dependent on prior colonial abuses 
that it may even fail the libertarian test of justice in acquisition.  FRANCK, supra note 20, at 20.  
51  O’NEILL supra note 22, at 134. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 66) 
- 16 - 
Empirical studies suggest that these inequalities are not on the whole working for the 
benefit of the least advantaged - quite the reverse.  Smaller economies are the most vul-
nerable to adverse changes in their trade, in the global economy, and in the international 
economic law system.  Thus, they face the most obstacles to economic development and 
effective competition. 
In view of these facts, applying Justice as Fairness to international trade leads to a 
very basic question which liberal states must address in their international economic 
relations: given the fact of inequality and its adverse effects for the least advantaged, 
how can the international economic system be re-structured to ensure that such inequali-
ties work to the benefit of the least advantaged?52 
Once the basic principles of justice have been identified, the next step according to 
Rawls is "to choose a constitution and a legislature to enact laws, and so on, all in ac-
cordance with the principles of justice initially agreed upon."53 In the case of interna-
tional economic relations, we already have the equivalent of a constitution and a legisla-
ture, albeit imperfect ones, in the GATT/WTO system and its attendant rounds of inter-
national economic negotiation and diplomacy.54 Moreover, through special and differen-
tial treatment, the international economic law system already incorporates laws and po-
licies that can function as redistributive mechanisms and that, in normative terms, can 
therefore serve as the basis for a just international trade law.   
A. Justifying Inequalities through Special and Differential Treatment 
In this section, I will argue that special and differential treatment can be understood 
normatively as an attempt to justify economic inequalities along Rawlsian lines.  Under-
standing special and differential treatment as a Rawlsian principle has important conse-
quences for the evaluation of its current iteration in unilateral, multilateral and regional 
trade policy. 
1. Inequality and the Role of the Market 
The key to understanding special and differential treatment as a Rawlsian tool for justi-
ce lies in understanding the way many of the natural and social inequalities among sta-
tes translate into the relative strength of consumer markets and producer groups.  States 
that are rich in natural resources and have developed significant social resources such as 
                                                 
52  Put another way, I am arguing that as an element of a just foreign policy, liberal states must pursue institutional 
policies which satisfy the difference principle. 
53  RAWLS, supra note 8, at 13. 
54  On the constitutional and law-making function of trade institutions, and their shortcomings in this regard, see 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 398 
(1997). 
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wealth, industrial capacity and technology, will as a result generally have a strong con-
sumer market, as manifested in per capita income, and a strong production base, as ma-
nifested in per capita GDP.  States that are poor in resources will generally have a weak 
consumer market, manifested in low per capita income, and a weak production base, 
manifested in low per capita GDP.   
Smaller economies covet access to the wealthy consumer markets of larger econo-
mies, even as they fear opening their markets to the powerful export capabilities of lar-
ger economies.  This means that market access becomes a key variable in any attempt to 
address inequalities through trade law.  At the core of special and differential treatment 
is the practice of asymmetric trade liberalization, to secure the benefit of developed 
country wealth and resources for the least advantaged states through market access that 
is both preferential, in that it is on better terms than those received by larger economies, 
and non-reciprocal, in that larger economies do not expect equivalent concessions from 
smaller economies in return.  It is this asymmetry which enables special and differential 
treatment to play a key role in justifying inequalities in the international allocation of 
social goods.55   
Market access is a central component of trade theory under any scenario, because it 
is in open markets that the principle of comparative advantage can operate.  However, in 
a redistributive context, open markets take on additional significance.  By opening their 
markets to smaller economy exports on a preferential basis, large economies in effect 
place the consumption power of their larger, richer consumer market at the service of 
the smaller economy, which can increase its exports and thereby strengthen its econo-
mic base.  Thus preferential market access for developing countries allows the inequali-
ties that manifest themselves in the form of wealthy consumer markets to work to the 
benefit of the least advantaged, thereby meeting the central criteria for distributive justi-
ce. 
Applying the difference principle to trade law with an understanding of the role of 
the market as a manifestation of economic inequalities, suggests that in a liberal theory 
of just trade, market access would need to be established on terms that benefit the least 
advantaged.  This conclusion can be restated in normative terms as follows:  
Liberal states must ensure that market access is structured so as to benefit the least 
advantaged. 
                                                 
55  Market access is managed through the two principal components of special and differential treatment: market 
access preferences and market protection mechanisms. In this essay, I will focus on the market access branch of 
special and differential treatment.  I refer interested readers to my evaluation elsewhere of market protection 
mechanisms, as well as the wealth transfer aspects of special and differential treatment.  GARCIA, , supra note 15, 
ch. 4. 
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Since preferential market access is managed through special and differential treat-
ment rules, this imperative can also be understood as a normative criterion placed upon 
special and differential treatment law as a condition of the difference principle.  
B Evaluating Special and Differential Treatment in Practice 
Implementation of a special and differential treatment regime consistent with Justice as 
Fairness brings us out from the world of ideal theory to the non-ideal world of trade law 
and economic inequalities as we find them.  In order to more fully determine the neces-
sary contours of such a policy in practice, we must examine how in fact special and dif-
ferential treatment operates in contemporary international trade relations.  This will al-
low us to accomplish two goals: to more fully specify what special and differential 
treatment should look like in a liberal system of just trade; and, second, to critically eva-
luate whether in fact special and differential treatment as currently constituted is capable 
of playing such a role, or must be reformed. 
Under current law, application of special and differential treatment is essentially bi-
furcated.  Preferential market access is primarily handled unilaterally through GSP, or 
Generalized System of Preferences, programs in which WTO members grant market 
access preferences in their trade relations with one another, whereas market protection 
is handled through the WTO treaties themselves.   
Current applications of the market access branch of special and differential treatment 
have been subject to a variety of political constraints and conditions.  As part of a liberal 
theory of just trade, we must consider whether such conditions are justifiable or accept-
able from a normative perspective.  In other words, at what point do the vagaries of im-
plementation of the principle of special and differential treatment imperil the justice of 
the trading system?  Examination of contemporary U.S. GSP programs suggests that the 
unilateralism which pervades current trade preference practice undercuts the effective-
ness, and justice, of the entire market access regime.   
1. U.S. GSP Practice: Unilateralism in Action 
U.S. GSP programs have several key features, found to some extent in all large econ-
omy GSP programs, which are suspect from the perspective of an international theory 
of Justice as Fairness: they are unilateral in nature, they exclude the most competitive 
exports, and they impose a variety of conditions on the beneficiary country.   
First, GSP-style preference programs are not based on mutual treaty obligations, but 
are discretionary programs.  That is, they are offered by the granting state on a conces-
sionary basis, and can be withdrawn at will.  Moreover, their periodic extension is often 
the subject of intense political negotiations between the granting and beneficiary states.   
Instrumentally, extending trade preferences through unilateral programs is question-
able on several grounds. First, this renders them inherently unstable, because as pro-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 66) 
- 19 - 
grams they are subject to periodic renewal, and within each program the beneficiaries 
must continually re-qualify for the preferences.  This creates problems for business and 
investment planners on both sides of the preference.56 In addition, the uncertainty sur-
rounding both periodic qualification decisions and decisions concerning continuation of 
the program, has understandably led to criticism on the part of beneficiary countries that 
they remain in dependent relationships subject to the whim of the granting state.57  
The difference principle as applied to international trade suggests that the unilateral-
ism of existing trade preference programs must also be reconsidered as a matter of jus-
tice.  Policies or practices now considered to be discretionary on the part of the imple-
menting state should more properly be seen as obligatory, when understood as the con-
sequence of a moral obligation of the granting state to its trading partners.  If a state has 
an obligation to justify its own social advantages by placing the strength of its consumer 
market at the service of the least advantaged states, then it is difficult to justify the view 
that such an obligation should be effectuated through a discretionary mechanism at the 
sole will of the advantaged state.  Moreover, the difference principle would imply that 
in no event should special and differential treatment simply be terminated, or its termi-
nation threatened or subject to threat, for political reasons having to do with the interests 
of the granting state.58  
Second, preference programs also tend to exclude exports of manufactured goods 
that are directly competitive with the manufactured goods of developed states.59 Such 
                                                 
56  See, e.g., Colombian Exporters Fear Loss of Tariff Benefits in War on Drugs, 13 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 204 
(1996) (Colombian private sector concerned that, given U.S. political climate, narcotics allegations against Sam-
per government could force Clinton to suspend preferences, raising tariffs with disastrous consequences for le-
gitimate export-dependent businesses). 
57  See Argentina, Peru Presidents to Press for Trade Liberalization, Integration, 13 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 206, 
207 (1996) (Peru’s President Fujimori considers the system of U.S. certification tied to narcotics record a ‘sword 
of Damocles,’ citing fear that U.S. misperceptions will deny certification despite good faith efforts); see also Co-
lombian Exporters Fear Loss of Tariff Benefits in War on Drugs, supra note 52 (legitimate Colombian businesses 
fear increased tariffs due to U.S. presidential politics would be ‘cutting off your nose to spite your face;’ U.S. is 
Colombia’s major trade partner and holds largest share of Colombian foreign investment). 
58  See Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the Promise of Development, 108 
HARV. L. REV 1715,  1725 (1995) (unilateral non-binding nature of preference programs serves interests of grant-
ing, not beneficiary states). 
59  One reason that the GSP effort is widely judged a failure is that most often the exports of greatest interest to 
developing countries are not covered. See generally Bartram Brown, Developing Countries in the International 
Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 362-63 (1994).  
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restrictions significantly undercut the expected economic benefits of such programs.60 
The U.S. GSP statute, for example, explicitly limits the range of articles that may be 
designated as eligible for GSP treatment by excluding those articles deemed “import 
sensitive.”61 Import sensitivity is determined according to the effects that the category of 
articles might have on U.S. industry if granted duty-free access.62  
The import sensitivity exclusion is troubling from a variety of perspectives.  To be-
gin with, this form of exclusion is flawed from the perspective of economic theory, in 
that it is trade-diverting.  Trade theory suggests that, where developed and developing 
country exports compete against one another under duty-free conditions, the one that is 
the most efficiently produced emerges as the most competitive, and production shifts in 
its favor are welfare-enhancing.  Rather than encourage such shifts, which would also of 
course aid the exporting developing country, the import-sensitivity exclusion obstructs 
such shifts by re-subjecting the developing country export to the artificial competitive 
disadvantage of the tariff, thus refusing to permit competition on equal terms and favor-
ing the less-efficient domestic producer. 
From the perspective of Justice as Fairness, the import sensitivity exclusion is truly 
perverse, in that it turns the moral justification of the trading system on its head. Under 
the difference principle, inequalities are to be justified by their working to the advantage 
of the least favored.  If special and differential treatment is to accomplish this justifica-
tion, then preferential treatment must be structured to further the interests of developing 
country exporters, not developed country competitors.  Instead, the import sensitivity 
exclusion deliberately structures the relationship in favor of the less-competitive domes-
tic industry.63 Thus rather than making the trade relationship more just, the import sensi-
tivity exclusion operates to make it less just, by creating a further inequality in social 
primary goods through the selective retention of tariff barriers.  
A third troubling aspect of the current form of preferential access policies is their 
conditionality.  In addition to subjecting the general availability of these preferences to 
the discretion of the granting state, actual availability of the preferences at any given 
time is often subject to conditions imposed by the granting state.  Taken as a whole, the 
U.S. program of unilateral preferences for the Western Hemisphere (the GSP, the Car-
                                                 
60  Robert Hudec, GATT and the Developing Countries, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 72. 
61  19 U.S.C. § 2463 (c)(1) (2003). 
62  See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2463 (b)(1)(B) (exempting from import- sensitivity watches deemed not to cause material 
injury to the U.S. watch industry). 
63  In fact, the structure of the exclusionary waiver suggests the sort of policy which might be arrived at under a 
“restricted-utility” analysis excluding the utility of foreigners, further underscoring the inadequacies of utilitarian-
ism as a theory of international justice. 
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ibbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA)) imposes 
certain questionable conditions.64 First, all three programs require that the beneficiary 
not be a communist country.  Second, all three programs condition the preferences on 
assurances by the beneficiary that it will provide the U.S. “equitable and reasonable 
access to the markets and basic commodity resources” of the beneficiary,65 and by re-
quiring that the beneficiary will not grant preferences to other developed countries 
which are found to hurt US commerce.  Third, all three programs require the beneficiary 
to adhere to a variety of international legal standards.  Examples include international 
expropriation and compensation standards; international intellectual property standards; 
workers rights; and extradition treaty requirements.  
The normative justification for this grab bag of conditions is seriously open to ques-
tion.  If inequalities must be justified according to the difference principle, and trade 
preferences are the mechanism to do so, then any conditions to those preferences must 
themselves be consistent with Justice as Fairness.  This means that conditions must con-
tribute to the benefit of the least advantaged state, i.e., the recipient, and not to the bene-
fit of the most advantaged, or granting, state.  Instead, such conditions are offensive to 
developing country recipients,66 and have nothing to do with the moral predicate for 
such measures in the first place, namely the needs of the recipient.   
The nature of these conditions suggests that the policy actually protects the interests 
of the granting state (its capital, intellectual property, competing workers and arbitral 
awards).  Moreover, the morality of using benefit programs for coercion, even if in ser-
vice of laudable goals, is questionable.  Conditions such as cooperation with US narcot-
ics efforts, extradition commitments, and eschewal of communism do not ensure that 
the benefits of inequality flow to the least advantaged.  Rather, they clearly relate to the 
domestic and foreign policy agendas of the granting state.  To refuse preferences on the 
basis of a failure to meet such conditions is to directly subvert the principle of justice 
which can legitimate the international trading system for liberal states. 
Thus conditionality as currently employed by the U.S. is not justifiable under a the-
ory of Justice as Fairness.  Such conditions entirely reverse the normative thrust of the 
policy away from the benefits to the developing country and towards the effects on the 
                                                 
64  The citations which follow are to the GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 et seq.; the CBI, 19 U.S.C § 2702 et seq.; and the 
ATPA, 19 U.S.C. § 3202 et seq..  
65  E.g., GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (c)(4). 
66  Message of the Ministers of the Group of 77 to the Third WTO Ministerial Conference, ¶ 12, at 
www.g77.org/Docs/message.wto.html [hereinafter G-77 Ministers] (“The preferential trade access granted to 
some of our countries continues to be tied to conditions not related to trade. We believe that these harmful prac-
tices, which conflict with WTO rules, should be eliminated.”). 
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developed country.  In this sense, special and differential treatment becomes an instru-
ment of economic coercion, rather than an instrument of distributive justice. 
C Reforming Special and Differential Treatment along Normative Lines 
Taken together, the shortcomings in preferential trade practice described above suggest 
more than simply a policy in need of tinkering: they suggest a fundamental failure on 
the part of the U.S. and other large economies to pay serious attention to the justice im-
plications of international economic inequality, and the normative role of special and 
differential treatment.  One finds at almost every key point that the provisions of special 
and differential treatment as implemented limit or subvert the basic principle of Justice 
as Fairness, i.e., justification by virtue of benefit to the least advantaged.  Instead, one 
sees that, despite the undeniable fact that some developing country exports do benefit 
from preferential access, the policy casts preferential access in an unstable and coercive 
form, limits access where it might do the most good, and manipulates access to further 
unrelated grantor goals.   
If, as I have argued in this paper, a liberal theory of just trade entails that interna-
tional inequalities be justified according to the difference principle, and if market access 
is the key to such justification, then liberal states cannot legitimately implement special 
and differential treatment in its current form.  Establishing the principle of special and 
differential treatment on discretionary grounds has the effect of casting an obligation of 
justice as an offering of charity.  Similarly, excluding the most competitive goods and 
tying preferences to domestic policy goals of the grantor are not justifiable.  Instead, the 
difference principle would require that a just trading system maintain special and differ-
ential treatment on a permanent, nonexclusive and unconditional basis, until the under-
lying facts of inequality change, or an even more effective justificatory mechanism is 
found. 
Incorporating the preceding normative and doctrinal analyses, these restrictions can 
be expressed as follows: 
Implementing a liberal theory of just trade through special and differential 
treatment requires binding, unconditional and non-exclusionary preferential 
market access.   
To the extent that the principle of special and differential treatment is a necessary re-
sponse to the moral obligations of wealthier states, then it must be implemented through 
a special and differential treatment policy that fully recognizes the implications of the 
liberal theory of justice outlined above.  A normative overhaul of preferential trade 
practice, in accordance with the difference principle, would create a more effective aid 
policy that would also greatly enhance the justice of the trade relationships involved.   
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V CONCLUSION 
The foregoing account of special and differential treatment and its place in a liberal the-
ory of just trade can be subjected to two types of criticisms.  One type of objection 
which can be raised is whether special and differential treatment is, in empirical terms, 
of much use in promoting justice.67 Insofar as the multilateral trading system is moving 
towards the progressive elimination of tariffs, quotas and other non-tariff barriers, the 
substance of preferential access is constantly eroding.  Economists already speak of the 
declining marginal utility of preferences in an ever-liberalizing regime.68 Another criti-
cism of a more theoretical nature begins in the problem of relativism: should a theory of 
just trade build on consensual human rights norms instead?  It has been argued that hu-
man rights offers a more promising basis for a normative theory of trade law, given its 
cross-cultural consensus, at least at the level of positive law.69  
While accepting the validity of these concerns, I have chosen a different route, as 
outlined above.  First, with respect to the empirical objection, I have chosen to focus on 
trade law as we find it today, fully recognizing that global circumstances and policy 
obsolescence could mean that in ten years trade law offers up a different set of doctrinal 
tools for normative analysis.  Second, at the theoretical level, not all states agree on the 
extent of consensual human rights, particularly in economic areas.  Rather than seek to 
ground the claims of justice in the contentious language of such controversial rights 
(just talking about trade and justice is controversial enough), I have instead chosen to 
examine the normative implications that flow from the political commitments liberal 
states have already made by virtue of their liberalism, as the starting point for consider-
ing questions of justice as they involve international economic relations.  While this 
may necessarily restrict the normative reach of the theory, it may have the virtue of 
grounding controversial claims about international justice where there is least disagree-
ment: one’s own domestic political commitments.  
Nevertheless, both criticisms raise valid concerns for this theory and any theory of 
trade justice.  Put more generally, at the theoretical level one must recognize the epis-
temic limitations inherent in working with any theory from a particular normative tradi-
tion, and continue to search for a theoretical basis for trade justice with the broadest 
                                                 
67  Pauwelyn, supra note 1 at 110-11. 
68  Bonapas Onguglo, Developing Countries and Unilateral Trade Preferences in the New International Trading 
System, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING (Mendoza, et al. eds., 1999). For this reason Joel Trachtman refers 
to market access preferences in particular as a “wasting asset.”  
69  Pauwelyn, supra note 1 at 112-14; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitu-
tion of International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407 (2003); Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: 
Implications for International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1425 (2000). 
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possible normative appeal. Empirically, one must endeavor to ascertain whether one’s 
prescriptions actually work at the doctrinal level: armchair empiricism is not enough.   
Both criticisms, and the theory’s own implications, point to additional areas for fu-
ture work.  For example, it is worth considering the next horizon for trade law if all 
normatively deficient aspects of special and differential treatment were miraculously 
addressed, by a WTO Round or some other mechanism.  As a starting point, there are 
serious questions involving the trading system’s procedural justice, or the justice of the 
institutional procedures it establishes and operates by.  One such procedure is the basic 
norm-creating process itself, which is built on a bargaining model in which political and 
economic power, as manifested in negotiating options, tactics and leverage, are allowed 
relatively free reign to set future law.70 While this model raises obvious issues with re-
spect to the WTO’s ability to deliver fair, distribution-sensitive outcomes, changing this 
process is not feasible as an immediate or mid-term goal.71 
A second, more incremental step, and no less important, is to focus on the procedural 
justice of the existing dispute resolution mechanism.  For example, any rights, prefer-
ences and safeguards which developing countries secure for themselves will ultimately 
have to be adjudicated through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and developing 
countries face serious obstacles to effective participation in the DSB.72    
The sort of normative critique of trade law developed here is also urgently needed in 
other areas of international economic relations.  Global social policy is currently set and 
managed through a variety of institutions in addition to the WTO, including the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, and spe-
cialized UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP to name a few.73  The rules and op-
erations of each of these organizations should be evaluated with respect to their consis-
tency with the tenets of liberal justice, as they apply to the substantive issues each 
agency manages. 
                                                 
70  Vicente Yu, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Decision-Making Process, (October 8, 
2005)(unpublished paper on file with author); Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distribu-
tive Organization, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1045 (2002). 
71  It may be that a long-term effect of constitutionalizing the WTO will be to develop constraints on the bargaining 
process itself.  
72  Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 177 (2006) (summarizing developing country challenges). 
73  For a comprehensive and insightful overview of the institutions which set global social policy, see Bob Deacon, 
Social Policy in a Global Context, in INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 211-47 (Andrew Hurrell 
& Ngaire Woods eds., 1999).  
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Finally, at the theoretical level there is much work to be done deepening and extend-
ing our approach to global justice within and beyond a predominantly Rawlsian/Kantian 
liberalism.   Political theorists such as Christian Barry,74 Hillel Steiner;75 Simon Caney,76 
Luis Cabrera77 and others are engaged in broadening the array of tools available within 
normative political theory for addressing questions of global justice.  Within the legal 
academy, there is a growing literature applying alternative principles of justice to eco-
nomic law institutions, such as John Linarelli’s use of Scanlon’s contractarian theory of 
fairness,78 or James Gathii’s argument that procedural fairness - making the WTO fully 
responsive to all its members - is a condition precedent to substantive fairness.79 
The process of creating a more just international economic order will require many 
such efforts by many scholars.   It is the author’s hope that by engaging in this exercise 
of developing a normative critique of trade law, such future projects have been facili-
tated.   
 
                                                 
74  Applying the Contribution Principle, in GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: ACHIEVING GLOBAL 
JUSTICE 280 (Christian Barry & Thomas W. Pogge eds.) (Blackwell 2005)  
75  Exploitation Among Nation, (manuscript on file with the author) (or cite to symposium). 
76  JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS (OXFORD 2005). 
77  POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE (ROUTLEDGE 2004). 
78  Principles of Fairness for International Economic Treaties, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY & 
SECURITY? (Padideh Ala’i et al., eds.) (ASIL Studies in Transnational Legal Policy Spring 2006). 
79  Fairness as Fidelity to Making the WTO Fully Responsive to All Its Members, 97 ASIL PROC. 157 (2003). 
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